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THE STING OF DEATH 
BY BONNIE MILLER-MCLEMORE 
"Although we no longer live in a world con-
structed around imagery of heaven, purgatory, and 
hell, a look at past attempts to comprehend the 
'great riddle' of death, as Augustine remarked, 
might help us. Listening first-hand to the words of 
Augustine, Calvin, or Kierkegaard vividly illus-
trates the tenor of the changes that have occurred 
over the sweep of more than nineteen centuries—but 
also the constancy of human experience beneath the 
changes fTJhey depict a reality we know, and in 
a way that can help us think about it more clearly." 
A SHIFT from traditional religious and moral views of death to more naturalistic understandings has taken place in Western society. This coincides with a shift from fear of judgment to 
fear of extinction. Prior to the Enlightenment, death appeared as a flaw 
in human nature due to transgression and involved final judgment 
before the Creator as well as hope for eternal life. To the modern ear, the 
traditional orthodox belief that we die because Adam sinned sounds 
quaint. In mainstream society, churched and unchurched alike tend to 
dismiss the whole issue of the relation of death, sin, judgment, and grace 
as antiquated. The original doctrine appears logically and empirically 
inconsistent with the modern worldview of death as a natural part of life. 
It seems to hold little relevance for the "living of our days." It does not 
even seem worth reinterpreting. If the traditional paradigm of death 
contained any theological and moral truths, they have been subsumed 
under modern paradigms. Images of grace, judgment, and eternal life 
are either stereotyped or, in some cases, dropped out of everyday usage 
altogether. Unfortunately, the more general awareness of death as a 
spiritual or moral event has also been lost. 
Medicine's so-called exhaustive explanation of death in scientific, 
"morally neutral" terms virtually eliminates appreciation for religious 
questions of meaning, mystery, and moral imperative. Many persons 
disregard notions of divine providence that explain death, ideas about 
grace that resolve guilt, or conceptions of commitment that dictate 
action. The church struggles for relevance in a world that considers its 
concerns about guilt, sin, faith, and health to be, at best, secondary, 
private, subjective, and, at worst, simply fantastical. Lacking adequate 
resources for dealing with failed responsibilities before illness and cut 
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adrift from cultural definitions of norms which in times past guided the 
exit from life, persons can no longer prepare for death. 
But in many cases persons with terminal illnesses await death over an 
extended period of time. They have concerns and questions about their 
situation and how to live under the heavy restrictions of this limited 
time. Although a grasp of the idea of five stages of emotions helps, they 
need ways, now long lost, to talk about deeper realities. Even an 
eighty-nine-year-old man with Alzheimer's disease senses that his 
"craziness," as he expressed it to his sixty-six-year-old daughter, 
reaches beyond psychological categorization. In a significant moment of 
lucidity, he acknowledges his awareness that he is "going to die," that he 
"can no longer take care" of her nor make any contribution—"I am not 
good for anything any more." How do we respond to the deep moral 
ambiguities that color our final days? 
I 
The Christian tradition has resources both for answering this question 
and for challenging some of the popular answers of modern culture.1 
Although we no longer live in a world constructed around imagery of 
heaven, purgatory, and hell, a look at past attempts to comprehend the 
"great riddle" of death, as Augustine remarked, might help us. Listen­
ing firsthand to the words of Augustine, Calvin, or Kierkegaard vividly 
illustrates the tenor of the changes that have occurred over the sweep of 
more than nineteen centuries—but also the constancy of human experi­
ence beneath the changes. If we can move past self-consciousness about 
our own framework of thought through disciplined, responsive conversa­
tion with some classic texts, we will find that they depict a reality we 
know, and in a way that can help us think about it more clearly. For 
instance, while Augustine's use of terms such as "heaven," "hell," or 
"immortal soul" assumes a frame of reference foreign to modernity, we 
may still be caught up in the truth disclosed if we can experience the 
response of each writer to the "world" of the text. Theologians writing in 
the fifth, sixteenth, and nineteenth centuries who, as we read them now, 
*Τοο often, resources within religious traditions have been ignored. I would speculate 
that when persons ask clergy in largely white, mainstream Protestant traditions what they 
can read that would help them through the difficult moments surrounding dying, death, 
grief, and bereavement, clergy refer them most often to On Death and Dying, Elisabeth 
Kübler-Ross' well-known book, more often than any other text on the subject. In this way, 
death becomes not only secularized and technicalized, but progressively psychologized. 
Frequently, when clergy and others struggle to find meaning, they turn to psychology and 
its practitioners for their often sensitive answers—not to theology, Scripture, or the church 
community and its traditions. As Joseph H. Fichter notes in his introductory editorial in an 
issue of Theology Today (April, 1981) that addresses this problem, caring ministry to the 
sick and dying seems "less pastoral than psychological." Liberal clergy "water down the 
religious content" of the caring role, according to Bernard Spilka and others in the same 
issue. My work and the recent work of others in the field of practical theology attempts to 
correct this tendency by reviving the meaning of theological language and values. 
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render their own worlds to us would agree that contemporary under-
standings of human mortality neglect basic moral and spiritual consider-
ations that are intrinsic to their own. And they would wonder about our 
narrow definitions and acceptance of psychological or medical plati-
tudes in the place of serious moral reflection. 
Much of the contemporary discussion of death completely ignores the 
historical realities that shape present dilemmas, leaving significant gaps 
in our knowledge. However, we must know our history. We cannot 
understand current dilemmas in this area apart from it. Moreover, the 
major constitutive myths of religious traditions offer us a kind of 
repository of options. Without necessarily affirming or rejecting the 
tradition, we can acknowledge that it contains within itself permanent 
human possibilities that merit our consideration. In addition, traditions 
shape our emotive, prerational responses beyond our wildest knowing. 
They "still possess us, [even] if we do not possess them."2 With a morally 
hazardous and potentially pathological issue like guilt, we must attend 
to how they do so or risk suffering the negative consequences of 
irrational possession. 
Augustine plays so crucial a role in shaping Western attitudes that we 
do ourselves a disservice when we ignore him. While Paul planted the 
idea that death is a punishment for sin (Rom. 5:12) and that it is 
overcome on our behalf by Christ (Rom. 6:23), it is Augustine who "first 
wove the dark themes of guilt, remorse, and punishment into the 
tremendous drama of creation, fall, incarnation, heaven and hell which 
has dominated the Christian imagination in the West until within the 
last hundred years or so."3 He lived in a period of general familiarity 
with death—"tamed death" as historian Philippe Aries calls the first 
phase in Western attitudes.4 Similarly, neither the Hebrews nor Paul 
seem inordinately preoccupied with anxiety about death. Of greater 
consequence is the larger moral drama surrounding death—corporate 
judgment, vindication, and restoration—of the historical community of 
chosen people. 
Between the twelfth and the early sixteenth-century, persons began to 
fear death and judgment in a more intense way. The corporate drama 
moves to the bedside of the individual: judgment of the individual soul 
acquires new meaning. The deathbed becomes a battleground between 
the forces of good and evil in the soul, determining an individual's fate 
for all eternity. Each person's biography and manner of dying gains 
tremendous moral significance. Earlier, Aquinas had given these ideas 
2Eugene Goodheart, Culture and Radical Conscience (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1973), p. 15, cited by Martin E. Marty, "Tradition and the Traditions in 
Health/Medicine and Religion," Health/Medicine and the Faith Traditions: An Inquiry 
into Religion and Medicine (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1982), pp. 23-24. 
3John Hick, Death and Eternal Life (San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1976), p. 207. 
4Philippe Aries, Western Attitudes Toward Death: From the Middle Ages to the 
Present, trans. Patricia M. Ranum (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1974), 
pp. 1-25. 
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force and cogency within the metaphysical framework of Aristotelian 
philosophy; he carefully considered such questions as the relation of 
specific individual sins to punishment. As Bosch's paintings dramati-
cally reveal, persons began to envision the particular tortures of hell that 
awaited them based upon their particular temptations. A penal attitude 
had thoroughly attached itself to death. In some ways, we live with the 
heritage of these pictures, whether or not we formally acknowledge it. 
Clearly, we can identify problems in this heightened punitive attitude. 
Why retrieve such a factor? Does it really help us understand the father 
with Alzheimer's or the friend with cancer? Although exaggerated in 
form, the images of death from Augustine through Calvin do point to an 
element of human nature, a moral uneasiness still known to us today. 
They suggest ways to talk about and deal with it. Augustine describes 
his mother in Confessions as gathering her son and his friends to her side 
for her final declaration of faith as she awaited the death that did not 
arrive until five days later.5 His mother had learned through religious, 
social, and mythic tradition to anticipate and ceremoniously approach 
death. Persons often awaited death far in advance. Openly, publicly, 
they carefully prepared for its arrival. They participated in clearly-
defined, solemn rituals that included expression of sorrow, pardon, 
absolution, a turning from the world to God, and, then, silence until 
death comes, whether immediate or not. 
Calvin's letter to a friend following the death of his wife reflects a 
similar appreciation for the proper act of dying: the act demands 
witness, admonition, exhortation, and prayer for the dying and for the 
dying person's friends and family.6 The shift away from corporate 
pronouncement to the individual reckoning of good and bad deeds on 
life's heavenly balance sheet made the ritual even more dire. The 
reformer's contention that no pious activity in purgatory or intercessory 
prayers from relatives on earth could alter one's fate made the final 
moment all the more critical. Today, many express a preference for 
sudden rather than lingering death, thereby avoiding the hardships and 
fears. Persons of earlier centuries dreaded the former; it would rob them 
of a last chance for repentance, confession, and reconciliation. This 
moment symbolized a high point in the Christian's career. 
Hence, although certainly susceptible to distortions, these overarch-
ing pictures of death and judgment foster ways of approaching death as 
a moral and religious, not purely physical, technical, or psychological 
turning point; it always possesses some moral and religious message. To 
cross over this boundary, persons need some kind of "art of dying"—the 
5Augustine, The Confessions of St. Augustine, trans. Rex Warner (New York: The 
New American Library, 1963), p. 202. 
6John Calvin, Letters of John Calvin Compiled from the Original Manuscript and 
Edited With Historical Notes by Jules Bonnet, trans. David Constable et al, 3 vols. 
(Philadelphia: Presbyterian Board of Publication, 1958); letter numbered CCXXXIX; I, 
333-335. 
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ancient tradition of a structured ritual prior to death that forces 
discernment of moral and religious sensibilities. In some ways, this art 
begs for retrieval. We hunger, sometimes without knowing, for the 
"right words" or the right actions to ferry us through the trying 
transitional moments that mark perhaps the most difficult of all "rites of 
passage." 
As late as the eighteenth century, Kant reprimands the minister who 
seeks only to comfort the dying, declaring this attempt to apply "a sort of 
opium to the conscience," "an offense" against both the individual and 
survivors. Rather, clergy must help the dying by stirring up and 
sharpening the conscience, so that the person can as far as possible 
render good and "wipe o u t . . . the remaining consequences of [one's] 
evil actions." Before "the reproaches of conscience," death is indeed a 
moment of moral anguish, according to Kant.7 Woe to the person who 
approaches the dying with only the Rogerian tool of "reflective listen-
ing," thereby sacrificing a final opportunity for necessary reconciliation. 
We must hurry to "make friends" with our "accuser" lest we be turned 
over to the judge (Matt. 5:25). How odd this strikes those of us 
encouraged never to impose our own values or views. Hospital chap-
laincy training and contemporary models of pastoral care heavily 
influenced by psychology and its eductive mode of responding have 
taught clergy and others to focus instead on eliciting a person's needs 
and desires and meeting them when possible. 
Granted love and accepting presence—an "unconditional positive 
regard," to use Carl Rogers' term—is absolutely indispensable. But we 
miss other crucial dimensions when we assume that with it we have 
exhausted the possibilities and ignore the ambiguities of the person's 
character and actions. A richer kind of love includes recognition of the 
latter in some shape or form. Beyond evoking feelings and gratifying 
final wishes—a style that Kiibler-Ross borrowed from Rogers and 
established as the law of proper hospital care—this alternative approach 
looks at the pain and loss behind the expressed feelings and desires and 
considers the call for moral and spiritual mediation. 
Certainly, this kind of response is more difficult than "listening 
reflectively." It requires a deeper empathy with the person's suffering in 
all its complexity, an awareness of the place of rage, insult, guilt, shame, 
and ways of responding to these—emotionally and religiously. While 
simply "sitting and listening" has an importance of which Kubier-Ross 
reminds us, so has awareness of moral failure, spiritual suffering, and 
disappointment as life ends, and, ultimately, of the need for moral and 
religious, not simply emotional, solace. Again, these are moral and 
spiritual concerns, not purely psychological ones. 
7Immanuel Kant, Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone (New York: Harper and 
Row, 1960), p. 72. 
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II 
Contrary to my own original presuppositions, I now realize that the 
popular psychological responses are the ones that come up short.8 Their 
portrayals of dying and death simply fail to encompass much that 
matters in this arena. For Freud, death was merely a return to 
"inorganic lifelessness."9 He held little regard for the moral or religious 
qualities of its victims. In most instances, under his tutelage psycholo-
gists and psychiatrists reduced moral activities and sensibilities to their 
psychological meanings. 
In a recent case conference, several pastoral psychotherapists and an 
attending psychiatrist discussed the situation of a young man who had 
taken a handful of pills in a fit of suicidal rage. In the conference, the 
psychiatrist recommended sending the man to a psychiatrist for evalua-
tion for medication that might control some of his erratic emotions. The 
next week the man, perhaps knowing something more fully than any 
psychiatric assessment could judge, told the story to his spiritual 
director. The director offered him a penance that required that he 
ponder the good gifts given him. This had more impact than any 
psychological assessment. 
In an extremely significant way, this spiritual response deserves 
recognition far beyond what it receives. Our psychological age has led us 
to mistake emotions related to moral quandaries—guilt, remorse, regret, 
depression, anger, blame, and so forth—for merely emotional "hang-
ups" that need to be "worked through" or medicated. We fail to see that 
they may require increased sensitivity to moral obligation, failed com-
mitments, or a need for some kind of moral and religious restitution by 
either party involved. Whether by intention or not, Freud and his 
followers reduce guilt and fear of judgment to pathology. Only the 
rational process of analysis or therapy, they believe, can relieve civiliza-
tion of this neurotic discontent. From this perspective, religion and 
moral theology have outlived their purpose. Rather than giving us ways 
to speak about guilt and anxiety concerning actual wrongdoing, they 
8I have addressed some of the specific problems and contributions of writings on death in 
psychology elsewhere. See, for example, Death, Sin and Death: Contemporary Cultural 
Interpretations of Death (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1988); "Doing Wrong, Getting Sick 
and Dying," The Christian Century (February 24,1988), pp. 186-190; and "Reassessing 
the Death and Dying Movement: A Study in the Formation of Culture," Second Opinion 
(forthcoming). Others within the fields of theology, philosophy, and ethics have criticized 
Kübler-Ross for various prescriptive statements. See Larry R. Churchill, "The Human 
Experience of Dying: The Moral Primacy of Stories Over Stages," Soundings 62 (Spring, 
1979), pp. 24-37; Roy Branson, "Is Acceptance a Denial of Death?" The Christian 
Century (May 7,1974), pp. 464-68; and more recently, Geroge Kuykendall, "The Dying: 
A Kübler-Ross Critique," Theology Today 38 (April, 1981), pp. 37-48. However, none of 
these authors situate their criticism of her work within a larger cultural context or 
broadened the analysis to include others within the death and dying movement. I believe 
that this broader cultural, ethical, and philosophical investigation is necessary for a 
comprehensive critique and understanding of what has happened in this arena. 
9Sigmund Freud, The Future of an Illusion, trans, and ed. James Strachey (New York: 
Norton, 1961), p. 19. 
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simply perpetuate oppression and mental disturbance through moralis-
tic and religious anachronisms. 
Likewise, according to several prominent psychologists in the death 
and dying movement, the anxiety that modern persons feel about death 
is merely anxiety about the terrifying possibility of nothingness. Or so 
argues Herman Feifel, an instrumental figure in modern psychology's 
attempt to have the final word on death. The "fear of death no longer 
reveals fear of judgment" as it once did, he contends, but simply "fear of 
total annihilation and loss of identity." Death signals "threat of loneli-
ness," not "salvation and atonement."10 Other psychologists follow suit: 
in general, they see fears about dying as no more than fears about the 
impending disintegration or dissolution of one's self and world. Even 
theological ethicist Paul Ramsey reflects the subtle influence of psycho-
logical culture upon his thought when he asserts that the chief sting of 
dying is not sin but solitude or desertion—dying alone;11 hence, "the 
dread of death is the dread of oblivion."12 
Certainly, should we stop to examine exactly what we fear when we 
consider our death—"one's own death" as Kierkegaard would remind 
us—we do find genuine apprehension about a void where there is 
absolutely nothing rather than something, and where we cannot even 
know that there is no-thing. In dying, we face irreparable loss of 
everything that constitutes who we have become and everyone whom we 
have loved. Death irreversibly tears us from life and casts us into 
"nothingness beyond," in Ramsey's words.13 
In addition, in its negative meanings fear of judgment deserves 
retirement. Freud and others have rightly revealed the problems of 
neurotic, guilt-ridden obsessions with rigid legalisms. The punitive 
attitudes toward AIDS of some branches of conservative Christianity 
exemplify such a misuse of narrowly-conceived moral language. Simi-
larly, persons reduce the rich ideas in the Christian tradition about life's 
intricate moral and spiritual balance to the simplistic idea that a "good" 
life results in eternal bliss, a "bad" life in eternal damnation. This 
orientation promotes the false stereotype that Christianity offers no 
other moral guidance than the bribe of heavenly security or the threat of 
condemnation. In these instances, religion does perpetuate oppression as 
Freud warned. 
But the sting of death is not purely solitude or the dread of oblivion. 
The sting of death includes despair and the sin that brings it about. To 
discount completely the concern about judgment as antiquated or as 
neurotic blatantly passes over something in the experience of dying, even 
10Herman Feifel, "The Problem of Death," in Death: Interpretations, ed. H. M. 
Ruitenbeck (New York: Delta, 1969), p. 126. 
nPaul Ramsey, The Patient as Person (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970), 
p. 143. 
12Paul Ramsey, "The Indignity of 'Death with Dignity/ " Hastings Center Studies 2 
(May 1974) 2, p. 50. 
13Ramsey, "Indignity of'Death with Dignity,' " p. 50. 
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if no longer well-articulated, that still troubles even the most emotion-
ally and spiritually stable person. It is precisely the problem of life's 
unfinished business that makes mortality troublesome, not simply the 
possibility of extinction. In despair, not death, we come to the end of our 
rope. To be sure, death threatens us with almost unimaginable cataclys-
mic loss. But the spiritually and emotionally highly developed self 
encounters death's threat on a level that crosses through and yet beyond 
that of the threat to self-object permanence, bodily existence, and 
psychological connections. Indeed, Christianity teaches us "to fear 
judgment more than death."14 
How tempted we are toward the simpler, more natural regard for 
death advocated by the Greek Stoics and stoicism in general. We know 
through science and our own experience of the changing seasons and 
cycles of life that death is, indeed, a natural part of life. Yet, we rob 
ourselves of fuller grasp of life's suffering if we believe that to exhaust 
the possibilities. The Stoic view of death as completely natural fails to 
address the whole of the human experience. It does not fully recognize 
human brokenness, or brokenness as a matter of personal responsibility 
and guilt. Therefore, as Paul Tillich contends, the Stoic does not face 
death with the "utter desperation" of the full human experience that 
includes sin, guilt, and condemnation.15 Guilt "adds to the natural 
'having to die' an anxiety which it would not have without guilt, namely, 
the feeling of standing under judgment."16 
Kierkegaard understood this better than most. He recognized a 
"sickness unto death" far worse than death itself or even anxiety over 
finitude. He stamped this premise upon human consciousness: the moral 
and religious dread of guilt takes up and surpasses the dread of fate.17 
The former attests to a height and depth of human spirit that the latter 
does not contain. Where fate threatens the human on the dual level of 
body and mind, guilt threatens us three-dimensionally as the body and 
mind strive to achieve the synthesis of spirit—the full actualization of 
self in time. The more complete the self, the more complete the tension 
between actuality and possibility, body and mind; the more freedom, the 
greater the sensibility to one's own inevitable yet necessary fallibility. 
We are both nature and spirit, in the world and yet transcending it. 
We stand in neither alone; we stand at the juncture—a third point where 
we can experience guilt about the synthesis. The term "guilt" reflects a 
"much deeper level of human reality" than an emotion or the voice of a 
chastizing conscience; guilt expresses "a permanent rupture" in the 
14S0ren Kierkegaard, Journals and Papers, ed. Howard and Edna Hong (Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, 1967), 1:523. 
15Paul Tillich, The Courage to Be (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1952), p. 17. 
16Tillich, Meaning of Health, p. 190. 
17S0ren Kierkegaard, The Concept of Dread, trans. Walter Lowrie (Princeton: Prince-
ton University Press, 1941), pp. 92-98. 
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structure of the self itself.18 By ourselves, we are powerless to mend the 
division. 
The sting of death, therefore, has these two dimensions: we fear death 
because it threatens annihilation of bodily existence and because it 
involves, in Calvin's characteristic terms, chastisement in which the soul 
feels the curse of God.19 All persons, not just believers, intuitively sense 
these two aspects. All fear extinction. Augustine, great psychologist of 
human nature that he was, recognized a deep resistance to annihilation 
even in senseless plants and irrational animals. Movingly, he addresses 
his congregation: "You do not want to die. And you want to pass from 
this life to another in such a way that you will not rise again, as . . . dead 
. . . , but fully alive and transformed. This is what you desire. This is the 
deepest human feeling: mysteriously, the soul itself wishes and instinc-
tively desires it."20 Jesus himself knew this dread and sorrow as he 
struggled in the Garden of Gethsemene. 
Yet, death holds a second, equally important dimension that twen-
tieth-century renditions have prefered to ignore, one that disappeared 
entirely in the preaching of early industrial society. AU fear death 
because, through their conscience and ability to discern good and evil, 
they experience death not only as annihilation but as some kind of 
judgment. Death has a twofold purpose: it is ordained, in Calvin's words, 
"not only for the dissolution of man, but also to make him feel the curse 
of God."21 
Augustine uses other terms—"first" and "second death"—to get at 
the same existential concern. The "first death" of body and soul happens 
to all as a result of disordered love—a turning away from God, the 
highest value, towards lesser goods. It may lead to the "second death." 
The second death—eternal alienation from God or "eternal death 
without any possibility of dying"—occurs only to the unfaithful after an 
interim following the first death.22 Significantly, it is not the first death 
that is rightly to be feared but the second. The first happens to everyone; 
the second only to the godless. Above all else, he warns us, we ought to 
fear alienation from God rather than death itself. 
These views on the relation between sin and death, outmoded as they 
may seem to some, enable exploration of a dimension of human dying 
18John W. Elrod, Being and Existence in Kierkegaard's Pseudonymous Works (Prince-
ton: Princeton University Press, 1975), p. 179. 
19John Calvin, Commentaries on the Book of Genesis, Vol. 1, trans. John King (Grand 
Rapids: Eerdman's, 1948), pp. 127-28. 
^Augustine, Sermon, 344, 4, cited by Peter Brown, Augustine of Hippo: A Biography 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969), p. 431, n. 6. 
2lRonald S. Wallace, Calvin's Doctrine of the Christian Life (Grand Rapids: 
Eerdmans, 1959), p. 267. 
22Augustine, City of God, an abridged version, trans. Gerald G. Walsh et al. (Garden 
City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1958), pp. 269-71 (XIII.2); idem, Enchiridion, Or Manual to 
Laurentius Concerning Faith, Hope, and Charity, trans. Ernest Evans (London: Richard 
Clay, 1953), pp. 79,98. 
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that often eludes modern reflection. We may find the idea of death as 
"curse" due to God's "judgment" confusing and alien. Yet, these terms 
reveal a moral and spiritual side of death. Death is not simply a physical 
transition but a moral and spiritual passage, which we rightly fear, 
mourn, and traverse in trembling, repentance, and faith. Whether 
described in terms of first and second deaths, fear of annihilation and 
judgment, dread of guilt, or unfinished business, the problem of moral 
and spiritual rather than purely physical and even psychological disrup-
tion deserves our attention. It is "the terror of this spiritual and eternal 
death," Calvin observes, "which makes bodily death—in itself already 
an evil—still more terrible."23 
Modern persons wrestle with physical death, demanding that it yield 
up some tangible meaning. This is impossible—or possible only in an 
extremely limited way. Individual, biological death in and of itself 
cannot confer an authentic existence upon the person as some existen-
tialists believe. This was not Kierkegaard's intent, as the forerunner of 
existentialism, when he argued that "earnestness" about one's own 
death can teach us how to live. He did not mean that this would help 
increase our temporal happiness. When the death and dying movement 
borrowed his idea that we should "live each day as if it were our last," 
they forgot the rest of his words—"and at the same time the first in a 
long lifer2" 
So, instead of advocating that we "enjoy today," "find what turns you 
on," and "not worry too much about tomorrow," as Kübler-Ross does,25 
we live in a moment of time that intersects with past, future, and present 
moments. We live in a moment for which we bear moral responsibility 
and spiritual accountability in relationship to others and God. This fact 
in and of itself produces a necessary and unavoidable moral and spiritual 
anguish before death. We must "number our days," as the Psalmist 
incants, so that knowing "thy wrath," we might gain a "heart of 
wisdom" (Ps. 90). With a new heart, we shall know a good death is not 
simply a human fact, but an act of faith and of moral and spiritual 
reconciliation. 
HI 
The source of meaning, then, lies not in earnestness about or even 
acceptance of one's own physical death, but in an extended web of 
relationships. These relationships are established in time between self, 
23John Calvin, Comm. on Rom., cited by Heinrich Quistorp, Calvin's Doctrine of the 
Last Things, trans. Harold Knight (London: Lutterworth Press, 1955), p. 76. 
24S0ren Kierkegaard, "The Decisiveness of Death (At the Side of a Grave)," in 
Thoughts on Crucial Situations in Human Life, Three Discourses of Imagined Occa-
sions, trans. David F. Swenson (Minneapolis: Augsburg Publishing, 1941), p. 107. 
Emphasis added. 
"Elisabeth Kübler-Ross, Living With Death and Dying (New York: Macmillan, 1981), 
p. 48; idem, Death: The Final Stage of Growth (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 
1975),p.xxii. 
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neighbors, and God, but have the potential of affecting all eternity in 
some way that we can never fully know or understand. Although 
Augustine understood the literal consequences of this idea far different-
ly, the meaning still makes sense: the very act of dying "faithfully and 
laudably" acquires a unique and crucial importance as a "precaution" 
against a more drastic death. 
A partial death is certainly accepted, but that is so that total death may not 
come, so that second death may not supervene, that death which has no 
end The separation of soul from body is accepted, so that the soul may not 
be separated from God.26 
We must dread, therefore, not simply the possibility of physical extinc-
tion, but total death that severs us from connections that rise through 
our physicality yet travel far beyond it. We foolishly "seek with all our 
power not to die," observes Augustine, fearing the very death that we 
cannot avoid. Rather, urge Augustine and Calvin, concern yourselves 
with "not sinning" and with the death that you can avoid, that which 
they depict as "godlessness."27 Accept and endure death, not as a good in 
itself, but "for the attainment and possession of a good." Accept it so 
that total death, separating a person from God's love, may not come. 
Only in this way is life truly received. 
By acceptance of death, I have something very specific in mind that 
differs dramatically from the Stoic or Kübler-Ross definition of a 
disciplined mastery over passion before a fate which is merely part of the 
natural cosmic order. Acceptance must entail moral and religious 
content, similar to what Kant described as a sharpening of conscience. It 
presumes acceptance of one's character throughout the whole of life, an 
area where we never totally succeed on our own account. Life is always 
to some extent a life of estrangement. No matter how long we prolong 
it—one of today's focal bioethical dilemmas—we must admit that we 
cannot bring about its consummation in any completely satisfactory 
way. This problem tests the limits of human power for solution and 
points us toward our need for a transcending power greater than the 
constrictions of finitude. While mediated through a companion sufferer 
on life's way, grace brings us fresh hope that more abundant life does 
abound. 
Knowing this, acceptance must contain some aspect of believing in the 
undeserved, absurd possibility of forgiveness, however mediated. It must 
include the message that human guilt has been conquered, a promise 
that goes beyond promise of psychological peace. Christianity has "only 
one 'argument' against death," according to Tillich: "the forgiveness of 
sin and the victory over him who has the power of death."28 In response 
26Augustine, City of God, trans. Henry Bettenson (London: Penguin, 1972), p. 517. 
"Augustine, The Trinity, trans. Stephen McKenna, in The Fathers of the Church, Vol. 
45 (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1963), p. 150. 
28Paul Tillich, The Shaking of the Foundations (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 
1948), p. 172. 
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to dying, we must address not only the fear of extinction but the place of 
judgment, the reality of guilt and sin in relation to finitude, and the need 
for forgiveness. Comprehensive response necessarily involves a graced 
completion of human incompleteness and a cleansing of human guilt by 
graced judgment and mercy. 
Given our natural inner aversion to pain of any kind, most persons 
would rather not consider the harsh connections between sin, judgment, 
and death, still hoping for a more "simple way out of the sinfulness of 
human history."29 Yet, when we give in to this temptation, we shatter the 
crucial connection between the physical and the moral as well as the 
individual and communal aspects of death and dying. Human death is 
far more than individual, biological transition of animated cellular 
material to inanimate matter. It involves questions of moral and 
spiritual commitment to life in community, to values that make life 
meaningful, and to the source of all life. Certainly, death is a natural 
part of life; of this, the death and dying movement has graciously 
reminded us. However, this reminder need not become an invitation to 
disregard death as a specifically moral and religious passage requiring 
careful guidance and normative instruction. 
We cannot abandon the concept of judgment and sin, especially in 
relation to death. The idea captures the freedom, albeit limited and 
often handicapped by destiny, we have to determine (or fail to deter-
mine) our destiny in relation to ourselves, others, God. This freedom and 
its constrictions become all the more earnest and certain in the face of 
death. Modern psychological and medical language limits comprehen-
sion of the problems of estrangement, disobedience, and infidelity, not to 
mention the mythical representation of sin as bondage to Satan. 
Religious tradition can limit our horizons as well, of course. When the 
church reduces the moral tradition to truisms about a "bad" life and 
eternal death versus a "good" life and salvational reward, perhaps it is 
not a bad idea to question it. But we stand to lose much if we throw out 
everything. There are rich resources in these ancient traditions that we 
moderns desperately need. 
29Reinhold Niebuhr, Christianity and Power Politics (New York: Charles Scribner's 
Sons, 1940), p. 3, cited by William C. Placher, A History of Christian Philosophy 
(Philadelphia: Westminster, 1983), p. 298. 
